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Abstract
Brazil’s rise was a globally acclaimed phenomenon that took place under two 
consecutive administrations: Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula 
(2003-2010). Under Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), though, Brazil’s foreign activism 
declined dramatically and its international visibility lost luster. This was due to a 
combination of domestic and systemic factors. This paper identifies these factors 
and gauges their influence in order to answer a main question: is there anyone to 
blame or was Brazil’s international rollback bound to happen?
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Introduction
On September 26, 2016, a historic summit took place in the Caribbean resort 
city of Cartagena. More than a dozen heads of state, twenty-seven foreign minis-
ters and ten top representatives of international organizations met to witness the 
signature of a peace agreement between the Colombian government and Colom-
bian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the oldest insurgent organization in 
Latin America. The presidents of Argentina, Cuba and Mexico among others, the 
emeritus king of Spain, Norway’s foreign minister and the secretary general of the 
UN applauded as president Santos and guerrilla leader Timochenko shook hands. 
Through live TV broadcasting, the world watched one of the most momentous 
political events that the region had undergone in decades. It is possible that Bra-
zil’s president, Michel Temer, had been among the viewers since, to be sure, he 
was not present at the ceremony. Brazil, South America’s putative leader, was 




Between 1995 and 2015, Brazil seemed to emerge as a regional leader and global 
power (Bethell 2010; Burges 2007; Reid 2014). Brazil’s rise in the region was 
incarnated in the concept of South America – as opposed to Latin America –, 
which was masterminded in the 1990s as a response to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) led by the United States, and institutionalized in 
the 2000s through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Brazil’s 
rise on the global stage was embodied in such acronyms as BRICS (a grouping 
of large developing economies comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa), IBSA (the three largest democracies of the South: India, Brazil, South 
Africa), and the environmentally-oriented BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, 
China). Brazil’s emergence was a combined outcome of domestic stabilization, 
a pro-active foreign policy, a lucky streak of outstanding national leaders, and 
a permissive international environment. Yet, just when these conditions seemed 
deep-rooted and Brazil’s rise was taken for fact (Gardini and Tavares de Almeida 
2016), everything changed. Two covers of The Economist, the first run in 2009 
(“Brazil takes off ”) and the second in 2013 (“Has Brazil blown it?”), illustrated 
the country’s reversal of fortune. A third one (“The betrayal of Brazil”), published 
in 2016, meant to be the last nail in the coffin.
What had happened? This paper addresses this question in three steps. First, I 
describe the permissive environmental conditions that allowed for Brazil’s break-
through onto the global center stage. Second, I examine the domestic resources 
Brazil was able to mobilize in order to raise its international profile. Finally, I ana-
lyze how both environmental conditions and power resources exhausted them-
selves, which converged with poor leadership to bring about foreign policy retreat.
Systemic Opportunities for Brazil’s Rise1
For a rising power, the permissiveness or restrictiveness of the international system 
is determined by two factors: polarity and rivalry. Polarity refers to the number of 
powers that determine the structure of interaction, whether unipolar, bipolar or 
multipolar. Ceteris paribus, the more the powers the more permissive the system. 
Rivalry refers to the degree to which the established powers are hostile or friendly 
to the rising power. This means that opportunities for peaceful rise, especially of 
middle or regional powers, are expected to improve with multipolarity and when 
other powers see the newcomer as a potential partner rather than a threat.
In 1991, two events prepared the launching pad for Brazil to take off. At the 
regional level, the signature of the Asunción Treaty gave birth to Mercosur, a 
trade deal that upgraded previous agreements with former rival Argentina, bring 
Paraguay and Uruguay into the group and secured Brazil’s back. At the global 
1 This section draws partially on Malamud (2011), Malamud and Alcañiz (2017) and Malamud and 
Rodriguez (2014).
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level, the collapse of the USSR meant the epitaph of bipolarity and opened the 
way, after the unipolar moment, for regional and middle powers to step into the 
forefront.
Regional Rise
Brazil’s peaceful relations with its neighbors are a consequence of having demar-
cated all its borders at the beginning of the twentieth century. A satisfied country 
facing no territorial claims, it could afford to build a security tradition based on 
the absence of strategic enemies. However, the regional scenario used to be far 
from idyllic.
Until 1979, Argentina was seen as a major security threat, and the possibility of 
a military confrontation shaped the mission of the Brazilian armed forces. This 
perception began to change when both countries, under symmetric military rule, 
signed an agreement on the shared Paraná river basin (Resende-Santos 2002). 
The following democratic regimes deepened this cooperation path by signing sev-
eral agreements covering nuclear to trade issues. In 1991, the Common Market of 
the South (MERCOSUR) was established, and the historic rivalry between Ar-
gentina and Brazil was turned into full-fledged regional cooperation. As Argen-
tina ceased to represent a threat, the Amazonian region began to be identified as 
the main security concern. Following several publications issued by military agen-
cies, a new approach became official in 1996 with the publication of the National 
Defense Policy (Battaglino 2013). The mission assigned to the Brazilian military 
was based on a scenario of asymmetric resistance against an extra-regional power 
intervention in the Amazon, as expressed in the 2005 update of the National De-
fense Policy and in the National Defense Strategy, issued in 2008. Extra-regional 
powers are never named but off-the-record statements point to the United States 
as the greatest source of concern. The national strategy focuses on the Amazon 
as well as on the so-called Blue Amazon, Brazil’s immense sea shelf and its oil 
reserves whose recent discovery has influenced the country’s strategic orientation. 
This involves not only the army but also the navy and air force, who should have 
conventional capabilities to deny hostile forces the use of the sea and to secure 
local air superiority (Brasil 2008). Two goals are constant throughout all official 
documents: keeping the equilibrium between the three forces and fostering the 
modernization of the military arsenal, often with an eye on the development of 
indigenous technology.
The absence of enemies in the neighborhood, together with the nonexistence of 
nuclear powers, have crystallized into a relatively secure environment in which 
transnational crime is sometimes more pressing than strategic threats. Indeed, 
trans-border issues such as drug-trafficking and arms-smuggling are increasingly 
sensitive. Other non-military troubles have sporadically emerged in the neigh-
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borhood, such as the negative externalities of domestic instability in contigu-
ous states or the unfriendly nationalization of Brazilian state utilities. The White 
Book on National Defense, issued for the first time in 2012, reflects the country’s 
overlapping defense, security and development concerns (Brasil 2012). A signifi-
cant factor behind this amalgamation is the developmentalist ideology of the rul-
ing coalition, which benefitted from low levels of threat perception to promote 
the inclusion of the defense area into a national development strategy.
The amalgamation of sectoral interests and policy areas has blurred the priorities 
of the defense agenda. Hence, the White Book lists four key areas: the (Green) 
Amazon, the Blue Amazon, the South Atlantic Ocean, and the western shore of 
Africa. Besides the precedence of responsibility over differentiated geographic 
areas, each military force has been assigned functional responsibilities: the Air 
Force is in charge of air control over the Green Amazon and space projects; the 
Army is responsible for border control and localized intervention in the hinter-
lands, as well as cyberspace; and the Navy remains in command of the Blue Ama-
zon and its pre-salt oil resources, but also of the country’s nuclear development 
including its crown jewel, the projected nuclear-powered submarine. As it turns 
out, organizational politics and developmentalist goals have influenced defense 
planning no less than strategic priorities.
Besides development, another constant in Brazil’s foreign policy has been the 
quest for autonomy, whose contours have adapted to changing times. While the 
country’s stance during the Cold War was labeled “autonomy through distance” 
vis-à-vis foreign powers and regional rivals, in the first decade after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall the country’s diplomacy promoted “autonomy through participa-
tion” in international institutions and regional organizations (Fonseca Jr. 2004). 
When Lula came to power in 2003, Brazil’s foreign policy acquired a moderately 
revisionist tone that was dubbed “autonomy through diversification” of partners 
and arenas (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009). “Autonomy through distance” was the 
diplomatic expression of Brazil’s developmentalism, under which the country ac-
cepted the demand for alignment with the United States while trying to use it 
as bargaining chip for economic advantages. Likewise, “autonomy through par-
ticipation” implied the adherence to international regimes in order to leverage, 
not impair, the country’s foreign policy leeway. “Autonomy through diversifica-
tion” sought the adherence to international norms by means of South-South and 
regional alliances in order to reduce asymmetries with the developed countries, 
thus always wedding the quest for autonomy with the goal of development. Un-
like most other world regions, security issues were downplayed or combined with 
other priorities. This calls for attention to context and history, as “where wars have 
been rare, power has perhaps a softer meaning than elsewhere, and policy options 
may thus be framed differently” (Malamud 2011: 4). As Hurrell (1998) argues, 
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South America “provides important grounds for doubting that regional ‘anarchies’ 
are everywhere alike.”
In the current Brazilian view, South America is not just a geographical region 
(different from Latin America as a whole) but also an autonomous political-
economic area, given that U.S. influence recedes as distance from Washington 
increases. Brazil’s elites consider this subregion to be within the country’s natural 
sphere of influence (CEBRI-CINDES 2007; Souza 2009), although this percep-
tion has slightly changed its value load in recent years as the region was increas-
ingly regarded as a burden rather than an asset (Malamud 2011).
Following Merke (2011), Latin America can be characterized by features that are 
accentuated in South America. First, in almost two centuries no state has disap-
peared and only one has been born. Second, the principle of Uti Possidetis (as 
you possess, you may possess) was agreed on even before the independence from 
Portugal and Spain and allowed state borders to be delimited much more peace-
fully than in Europe. Third, Latin America is the world region that contains the 
most bilateral and multilateral agreements related to the peaceful settlement of 
conflicts (Holsti 1996; Kacowicz 2005), as well as the “world record of adjudica-
tion and arbitration” (Kacowicz 2004: 199). International comparison is stunning: 
while “there have been some twenty-two instances of legally binding third-party 
arbitrations or adjudications with respect to sovereignty over territory in Latin 
America…, similar rulings apply to only one small case in continental Europe…; 
two among independent states in Africa; two in the Middle East; and three in 
Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific” (Simmons 1999: 6-7). Fourth, as mentioned, 
Latin America is a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In summary, state survival has been 
virtually guaranteed, wars have been rare, and legalization of disputes has been the 
norm. This does not mean that political violence has been eradicated, but either 
“there has been a limited conception of force within a strong diplomatic culture” 
(Hurrell 1998: 532; also Mares 2001) or it has been confined within – as op-
posed to across – borders (Martin 2006). Therefore, security has acquired a more 
domestic than international connotation. Brazil is a product of this historical and 
geographical environment, and as such it carries more resemblances to its neigh-
bors than to either the traditional European states or the new emerging powers.
Global Rise
Brazil’s strategic ambitions were marked by two events. First, the country reverted 
its longstanding policy of non-interference by contributing troops to, and even as-
suming the leadership of, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 
which was established in 2004. Second, it took global center stage in 2010 when, 
together with Turkey, it sealed a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran. Indeed, the 
turning down of the deal by the UN Security Council marked the beginning of 
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the end of Brazil’s international apogee.
In the economic realm, the factor that most boosted Brazil’s foreign reputation 
was its promotion as a BRIC country (Armijo 2007). A report by the investment 
firm Goldman Sachs predicted that the combined economies of the BRIC coun-
tries would eclipse those of the current richest countries of the world by 2050 
because of their rapid growth rates. The report did not advocate the creation of an 
economic bloc, but eventually the four countries sought to form a “political club” 
and convert their economic power into geopolitical stature.
Brazil has also shown skills in the realm of commercial negotiations. Although 
the current World Trade Organization (WTO) round has stagnated, a new col-
lective actor has emerged from it: the Group of 20 (Trade G-20). This bloc of 
20-odd developing nations brings together 60 percent of the world’s population, 
70 percent of its farmers, and 25 percent of world’s agricultural exports. Its origins 
date back to June 2003.
The expansion of the Group of Eight (G-8) to the Outreach Five or Plus Five 
(Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa), known as the Heiligendamm 
process and started in 2008, was a further moment for Brazil to celebrate its glob-
al rise. Eventually, the country also became a member of the Finance G-20 (more 
formally, the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors), 
a group of 19 of the world’s largest national economies plus the European Union.
As to the soft aspects of Brazil’s international activism (Flemes 2007), IBSA be-
came a cornerstone. A limited and “principle-oriented” grouping, the acronym 
refers to the trilateral developmental initiative between India, Brazil, and South 
Africa to promote South-South cooperation and exchange that was launched in 
2003. This group was publicized as bringing together the largest democracies on 
every continent of the Southern Hemisphere (Saraiva 2007). It therefore con-
veyed more powerfully than the BRIC the Brazilian foreign policy banners, such 
as democracy, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
An even more ambitious dynamic was reiterated at the Copenhagen Summit on 
Climate Change in December 2009, when the leaders of China, India, Brazil, and 
South Africa negotiated the final declaration with U.S. president Barack Obama 
to the exclusion of the European Union, Russia, Japan, and other global powers.
A last conspicuous sign of international recognition of Brazil as an emerging 
power and regional representative was the European Union’s 2007 invitation for 
a “strategic partnership.” This is notable because the EU had been reluctant to 
engage other Latin American countries – especially those of MERCOSUR – 
individually. The times seemed ripe for Brazil to be considered as a global actor.
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Brazil’s Domestic Resources2
Social power, or the capacity to make others do something they would not other-
wise, rests on three types of resource: coercive or political, material or economic, 
and persuasive or symbolic (Poggi 1990; Baldwin 2013). In international rela-
tions, the first two are often paired, giving rise to a twofold classification: “hard 
power” is based on the utilization of structural (that is military or economic) 
means to influence the behavior or interests of others, while “soft power” refers to 
the ability to achieve one’s goals through co-optation and attraction rather than 
coercion or payment (Nye 1990). Ideas, institutions, and exemplary behavior or 
performance are the main instruments of the latter kind of power. As impressive 
as Brazil may look to the untrained eye, its hard power is often overestimated and 
most of its international achievements are based on the soft power deployed by its 
resourceful diplomacy (Burges 2008).
Despite its vast territory, relatively large armed forces and considerable defense 
budget, the highest in Latin America, Brazil is not – and has no intention of 
becoming – a military power. Instead, it describes itself as a peace-loving, law-
abiding, and benign power (Lafer 2001; Brasil 2008); in the global scale it is a 
military lightweight. Brazil does not have, nor according to its Constitution is it 
allowed to have nuclear weapons, which sets it apart from both the established 
and emerging powers. Despite being the fifth country in the world by area and 
population and the seventh by the size of its economy, it is not ranked among 
the top-10 states when it comes to military personnel, military expenditure, arms 
exports or imports, or participation in peace operations (SIPRI 2012). Moreover, 
when measured as a proportion of GDP, its military spending is considerably 
lower than other South American states such as Chile and Colombia (Figure 1).
2 This section draws on Malamud and Alcañiz (2017).
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Figure 1: Military expenditure as % of GDP, selected South American coun-
tries, 1994-2016
Source: Elaboration by Júlio Cossio Rodriguez from data of SIPRI (2016).
Brazil also lacks the economic leverage to buy its way into regional or global 
leadership. Economic growth has been somewhat low and inconsistent even dur-
ing Lula’s much-praised decade (Figure 2), and it ranks at the bottom amongst 
the emerging markets. Physical infrastructure is scant and aging (The Economist 
2013), threatening to become a bottleneck for development and a drain on na-
tional resources. Furthermore, the country’s position in education, innovation and 
competitiveness rankings is gloomy. This has raised recurring fears of “the curse of 
the hen’s flight,” which describes “the centuries-old succession of brief periods of 
strong economic growth followed by phases of stagnation and depression” (Val-
ladão 2013: 89).
Figure 2: Brazil GDP Growth Rate, 2004-2016
Source: World Bank Data (GDP growth, constant 2010 USD).
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Unlike Germany’s position in Europe, Brazil is the largest Latin American econ-
omy but not the richest. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay rank consistently higher 
in terms of GDP per capita and human development, and Mexico and Venezuela 
do so intermittently depending on oil prices. As a consequence, Brazilian politi-
cians have found it extremely hard to sell domestically the importance of money 
transfers to neighboring countries, as this would entail sacrificing poor Brazilians 
to benefit wealthier foreigners.
Given the shortage of hard power resources, Brazil is one of the few emerg-
ing countries to have staked its future on soft power (Burges 2008; Sotero and 
Armijo 2007). This is based primarily on diplomacy, on the wise use of its cultural 
charm, and on its growing role as a facilitator and cooperation supplier. Succes-
sive administrations have put diplomacy to profitable use, managing to translate 
scale into influence. They have sat Brazil at every negotiation table to address 
issues as diverse as climate change, world trade, nonproliferation or cooperation 
for development. In the region, Brazilian envoys have often mediated in third 
party conflicts through the least intrusive means available. As is proudly said in 
Itamaraty, the foreign ministry palace, Brazil has a “diplomatic GDP” that ex-
ceeds its economic one: in other words, it can punch above its weight because of 
the high quality of its professional diplomacy. Yet, it was presidential diplomacy 
that turned out to be decisive in fostering the country’s international reputation 
(Malamud 2005; Cason and Power 2009). No other country can boast a lucky 
streak of two exceptional presidents over sixteen consecutive years, plus the initial 
hopes raised by the election of the first ever woman as president. World class 
scholar Fernando H. Cardoso and iconic metal worker Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
became symbols, in themselves, of a vibrant and progressive society. Moreover, 
both of them manifested an impressive dexterity at foreign policy management. 
Three able foreign ministers, two of which were professional diplomats, contrib-
uted to endowing Brazil with towering global prestige. Alas, lucky streaks do not 
last forever.
Inaugurated in January 2011, Dilma Rousseff was Lula’s choice as the candidate 
of the incumbent Workers´ Party. Most observers believed that she would follow 
in his steps, whether on domestic or foreign policy issues. In keeping Lula’s top 
foreign policy advisor, Marco Aurélio Garcia, Dilma hinted at continuity. How-
ever, her visible lack of charisma and her disinclination towards foreign affairs had 
led analysts to suggest that her foreign policy would be “less of the same” (Mal-
amud 2011). Both handicaps could have been compensated by an able foreign 
minister empowered by presidential delegation (Amorim Neto and Malamud, 
forthcoming); yet, Dilma chose a different path. If Lula had only one foreign 
minister in eight years, Dilma had three in five years – and never fully trusted any 
of them. Foreign policy retreat was built into the president’s personality; yet, the 
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rollback of Brazil on the global stage was not only due to poor leadership. Dilma’s 
mismanagement of foreign policy (Cervo and Lessa 2014) combined with struc-
tural conditions, both systemic and domestic, that were already becoming unfa-
vorable to Brazil.
The Underlying Causes of Brazil’s International Rollback
The end of Brazil’s golden age does not hinge on a single cause but on a combina-
tion of six. As shown above, they can be classified according to two criteria: the 
opportunities or restrictions provided by the international system, and the type of 
domestic resources involved. Table 1 displays the resulting matrix of conditions.
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The political opportunities for Brazil to rise have been studied in depth by Ro-
driguez (2012, 2013). He shows that every time that the country increased its in-
ternational prominence throughout the twentieth century, the underlying reason 
was the margin of autonomy allowed for by the emergence of a contending power 
to the global hegemon. Nazi Germany during the interwar period, the USSR at 
the apogee of the Cold War, and China at the beginning of the 2000s created 
the conditions, by either holding or distracting the US, for an otherwise weak 
regional power to intrude into global affairs. If this analysis is correct, China’s cur-
rent retraction and its unwillingness to geopolitically challenge the US (Urdinez 
et al 2016) set a limit to how far Brazil can or will dare to go. The only chance to 
recreate an enabling environment would be for India to come forward as a global 
power that challenges the status quo, a highly unlikely event in the foreseeable 
future.
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Figure 3: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), selected countries, 
1960-2012
 
Source: elaboration by Júlio C. Cossio Rodriguez from data of Singer et al (1972, 
v5.0).
Economic opportunities determine how Brazil connects its productive structure 
with global markets. By the mid-twentieth century, it did so as a dessert producer: 
sugar, cocoa and coffee made up to 85% of its exports. After the so-called eco-
nomic miracle of the early 1970s and the currency stabilization of the early 1990s, 
Brazil became an exporter of manufactured goods, with the latter accounting for 
60% of total exports. After that, the emergence of China led to a reprimarization 
of exports (Figure 4a) – and, in relative terms, of production. China displaced 
the developed economies of the West, mainly the US, as the center of a new 
dependent relationship where Brazil occupied the same peripheral position as 
ever. Henceforth, Brazil’s emergence as an agricultural powerhouse had deleteri-
ous effects upon its productive structure. When China’s growth halved, in the 
2010s, Brazil’s economy plummeted (Figure 4b). An international opportunity 
had inadvertently turned into a restriction.
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Figure 4a: Brazil-China Asymmetric Interdependence
Figure 4b: Brazil-China Growth Correlation
Source: elaboration by Joaquim Cadete from data of the World Bank and Brazil ’s 
Central Bank.
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Ideological/normative opportunities are more slippery than political and eco-
nomic ones. After Trump’s retreat from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
his threat to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, it is less clear than ever 
whether there exists a global demand for softer, greener, gentle powers – even 
less whether there is still appeal in boasting to be a “rainbow nation.” In the new 
perplexing scenario, it is hard to see how Brazil could insert itself successfully into 
a new, attractive narrative.
Domestic resources do not foster optimism either. The geopolitical resources Bra-
zil counts on are reduced. A military dwarf in global terms, it devotes less than 
1.5% of its GDP to defense. Brazil’s troops numbered around 320,000 in 2012, 
a figure closer to those of its smaller neighbors than to those of the world´s great 
powers (Figure 5). Furthermore, as more than 80% of the military budget is spent 
on salaries and pensions (FIESP 2011), logistical means are both inadequate and 
antiquated. Plans to build a nuclear-powered submarine have been allegedly un-
derway since 2008, when a contract was signed with France. However, there are 
no prospects that the project will be completed before 2027 – if ever. Given Bra-
zil’s military weakness, its only advantage is that it faces no strategic threats. Yet, 
its low military investment means that the country is unable to project force or 
influence strategic decisions far away from its own borders.
Figure 5: Military personnel in selected countries, 1930-2012
Source: elaboration by Júlio C. Cossio Rodriguez from data of Singer et al (1972, 
v5.0).
Economic resources are also scarce. Participation in global trade is much smaller 
than the country’s world share of GDP or population: it stands slightly over 1% 
vis-à-vis 3%, a figure lower than fifty years ago that puts the country at 22nd 
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in world rankings (WTO 2012). The re-commodification of the economy and 
exports (Figure 6a), together with the asymmetric association with China, has 
become a burden for development. Underdeveloped infrastructure, technological 
backwardness, and limited innovation compound a gloomy picture (Figure 6b). 
Without either a productivity revolution or the advent of a new giant market for 
its commodities, Brazil’s economy is not expected to reach consistent growth in 
the coming years.
Figure 6a: Brazilian Exports by Economic Sector, 1964-2012
Source and elaboration: MDIC/SECEX
Figure 6b:
Source: http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21586680-getting-brazil-
moving-again-will-need-lots-private-investment-and-know-how-road, accessed 5 
July 2017.
Finally, soft resources of power have been depleted. If humanitarian interven-
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tionism or international cooperation for development were once thought of as a 
means for regional leadership and “global protagonism” (Harig and Kenkel 2017; 
Pinheiro and Gaio 2016; Stuenkel 2011), those times seem to be over. Dilma 
drastically reduced the budget for humanitarian assistance and cooperation aid 
already in 2013 (Figure 7), and her successor continued this trend. The unhappy 
end of Rousseff ’s mandate, which combined her lackluster performance with the 
darker reputation of her accusers, not only stained Brazil’s standing abroad but 
also produced an inward looking reflex that manifested itself in a wider retraction 
from global affairs. Even though Brazilian citizens chair important organizations 
such as the WTO and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Itama-
raty’s influence has receded to unexpected magnitudes.
Figure 7: Brazil’s Humanitarian Donations to African Countries, 2010-2014
Source: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2015/03/1606466-brasil-recua-e-
reduz-projetos-de-cooperacao-e-doacoes-para-a-africa.shtml, accessed 2 July 2017.
The rise of Vice President Michel Temer to the presidential office, which followed 
the ousting of Rousseff through congressional impeachment, was the last nail in 
the coffin of a twenty-year period of international prestige. Not only was Brazil 
nowhere to be seen when most of the Latin American presidents and several 
world leaders convened in Colombia to witness the signature of the peace agree-
ment between the government and the FARC, but a few months later Temer de-
clared that he would not attend the 2017 summit of the G20 in Germany due to 




Insufficient resource endowment and cumulative policy mistakes mounted over 
increasingly unfavorable international conditions to produce foreign policy retreat 
and, ultimately, Brazil’s international rollback.
A permissive systemic structure took root between 1991 and 2011: the end of 
the Cold War, the emergence of China, and a global appetite for softer forms of 
power fostered Brazil’s rise. The rainbow giant seized the opportunity by capital-
izing on its material – mainly natural – and symbolic – mainly cultural - charm, 
potentiated by shrewd presidential and professional diplomacy, to get a seat at 
every negotiating forum that opened up. However, its domestic resources were 
exhausted almost at the same time as the international conditions reverted to 
unfavorable, mostly due to the global financial crisis and China’s change of devel-
opment model. The combination of unfavorable conditions at home and abroad 
determined Brazil’s drastic rollback from the international stage.
True, Brazil still is – and is expected to continue to be – a large country, a regional 
power, and an actor with a global voice. If demography is destiny, Brazil will 
eventually rebuild an international position of prestige for itself. In the foresee-
able future though, its chances to become a regional leader or a global power are 
rather dim.
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